Over the past several days, the Iran war has taken another important turn.
Iran struck U.S. forces in Jordan. Saudi Arabia openly joined military operations against Iran-backed forces. The Houthis continue expanding pressure on Red Sea shipping. Ukraine has opened a new front against Iranian interests. And despite overwhelming American military power, the conflict continues to widen rather than narrow.
Most observers see these as separate headlines.
I don’t.
I believe they are all part of the same strategic story.
My recent Foreign Affairs article argued that the Iran war has fundamentally changed America’s strategic position in the Middle East.
This Thursday evening, I want to go one step further.
What if the defining feature of this war is no longer what Washington decides?
What if more and more regional actors are beginning to shape events independently—making the conflict progressively harder for any government, including the United States, to control?
That is a very different kind of strategic problem.
For more than three decades, American power rested on four assumptions: forward bases could safely project power, air superiority would dominate the battlefield, precision strike would produce rapid victories, and overwhelming technology would allow the United States to defeat regional adversaries quickly and at relatively low cost.
The Iran war is testing every one of those assumptions.
The United States has demonstrated overwhelming military superiority. Yet it continues to struggle to achieve the political objective that matters most: restoring secure commercial access through the world’s most important maritime corridors. Meanwhile, relatively inexpensive missiles and mass-produced drones have placed American bases, allies, and critical energy infrastructure under sustained pressure.
If that assessment is correct, then this is no longer simply a debate about Iran.
It is a debate about whether the military model on which Washington spends roughly $1 trillion each year—and is preparing to spend substantially more—still produces the strategic outcomes it was designed to achieve.
More importantly, it raises an even larger question.
What happens when a dominant power can still win battles—but can no longer reliably dictate the strategic agenda?
This evening I’ll examine why I believe that question helps explain not only today’s headlines, but where this war is likely headed next—and why the implications extend far beyond the Middle East to Europe, the Indo-Pacific, global markets, and the future of American strategy.
Prof Pape Live Briefing
Thursday, July 30 • 7:00 PM ET
Paid subscribers receive the Zoom link automatically 15 minutes prior, can ask questions throughout the discussion, and receive the full video recording afterward to watch whenever it’s convenient.
I hope you’ll join me this evening.
Does anyone have the link to the recording?